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Abstract
In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reformed shareholder vot-
ing by eliminating uninstructed broker voting in director elections. We use this reform
as a quasi-natural experiment to assess the value of shareholder empowerment. Using
different control groups and various cross-sectional tests, we find that the reform did
not increase average equity values.
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1 Introduction
The right to elect the board of directors is perhaps the most fundamental right of shareholders
in a corporation. In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) banned broker
votes for the elections of directors.1 Prior to the reform, registered brokers were allowed
to vote at their discretion in director elections if their clients had not given them voting
instructions before the annual meeting. Historically, such uninstructed broker votes were
almost always cast in favor of management’s nominees and amounted to approximately 11
to 14% of the votes cast (Bethel and Gillian, 2002). The stated goal of the reform was to
improve corporate governance by making board elections more competitive.
For research in corporate governance the elimination of broker voting is of great interest
because it provides a quasi-natural experiment to estimate the effect (if any) of shareholder
empowerment on equity values. On the one hand, the reform may be beneficial for share-
holders because it gives them more power to hold boards accountable in elections. On the
other hand, both empirical and theoretical research recognizes that shareholder empower-
ment may be costly. For example, investors may lack relevant information, their intervention
might discourage managerial initiative, or they might pursue specific agendas. In a survey
article, Yermack (2010) discusses the costs and benefits of shareholder empowerment and
conjectures that the elimination of broker voting is a major governance reform that, together
with two other reforms (of voting standards and proxy access), will make shareholder voting
more effective.
Understanding the costs and benefits of shareholder empowerment is not only impor-
1The final release by the SEC is available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse/2009/34-60215.pdf.
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tant for academics but also for practitioners. Indeed, the reform of broker voting received
widespread attention and support by market participants, the business press, and by policy
makers. In 2007, the Wall Street Journal (Scannell, 2007) wrote that “investors ... may soon
get a boost, as the role of shareholder votes cast by brokers comes under closer scrutiny.”
The Council of Institutional Investors declared in 2009 that “this long overdue reform is
needed now more than ever” and proxy advisor firms Glass Lewis and ISS were also strongly
supporting the rule change.2 In addition, the U.S. House of Representatives exposed the
SEC to political pressure.3
We contribute to the literature on corporate governance by estimating the stock market’s
response to the elimination of broker voting in director elections. We consider nine impor-
tant dates in the period between 2003 and 2009 that increased or decreased the probability
that the reform would be implemented and run an event study using two different control
groups. Our results suggest that the reform did not increase shareholder value. In almost
all specifications we fail to find any valuation effect. In the few specifications that yield sig-
nificant results, abnormal stock returns are negative. Moreover, in a cross-sectional analysis
we examine subsets of firms for whom the reform was likely to be most relevant and again
find no increase in value for these firms. Overall, our findings suggest that the reform was
not effective and did not benefit shareholders.
Our paper is closely related to other recent studies of governance reforms. A contempora-
neous working paper by Anderson and Nayar (2013) also examines the elimination of broker
2See http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nyse-2006-92/nyse200692.shtml. ISS demanded already in 2003
that broker votes be abolished (see http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/iss121803.htm).
3See http://www.shareholdercoalition.com/marketoversighthearingtranscript.pdf.
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voting. They focus on six dates and find that the reform had a value-neutral effect on five of
their six event dates, which is consistent with our results.4 Akyol et al. (2012) and Larcker
et al. (2011) study the wealth effects of attempts by the SEC to facilitate shareholder proxy
access and find a negative effect on shareholder wealth, whereas Becker et al. (2013) and
Cohn et al. (2014) conclude that the stock market put a positive value on shareholder proxy
access. Our finding that the reform of broker voting had a neutral (or negative) effect is
more in line with Akyol et al. (2012) and Larcker et al. (2011), as it points out limitations
of recent governance reforms.
2 Timeline of the Change in Broker Voting Regulation
Rule 452 of the New York Stock Exchange allows brokers to vote at their discretion at an-
nual meetings on “routine” proposals if they have not received voting instructions from their
clients.5 Uncontested director elections were considered to be a “routine” matter until 2009,
when the SEC approved a NYSE proposal that classified uncontested elections as “non-
routine,” thus eliminating broker votes. The reform became effective for annual meetings on
or after January 1, 2010.
4Our methodology differs from theirs in several respects. While they, like us, consider a global market
index as a control group, we moreover use a second control group, the returns of firms registered under the
Investment Act of 1940. The latter type of firms was exempted from the rule change due to an amendment
filed by the NYSE with the SEC on May 27, 2007. A second difference between the studies concerns the
choice of reform-related event dates. While we consider nine event dates leading up to the rule change, they
focus on six dates, including some of the same dates examined by us.
5NYSE Rule 452 lists “non-routine” matters on which brokers cannot vote without instructions from
clients such as contested director elections and merger proposals.
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Table 1: Events Related to Broker Voting
This table presents an overview of important regulatory and legislative events related to broker voting. The
events are obtained by an extensive search in Factiva, Google, and the SEC’s website. The last column
reports whether the event increases or decreases the likelihood of the elimination of broker voting.
Event # Event Date Event Description Regulation
Likelihood
1 July 30, 2003 Broker voting lands on the SEC’s radar screen Increases
2 November 17, 2004 Early Dow Jones Newswire Increases
3 April 25, 2005 First NYSE Working Group meeting Increases
4 June 5, 2006 Recommendations of Working Group published Increases
5 October 24, 2006 Rule proposed to the SEC Increases
6 September 28, 2007 Reports on postponement Decreases
7 May 21, 2008 Press reports about proposal being stuck Decreases
8 February 26, 2009 Rule published for comment by SEC Increases
9 July 1, 2009 Rule approved by SEC Increases
We identify nine important event dates in the reform process. The regulation of broker
voting first received attention in 2003. According to a detailed article in the Wall Street
Journal (Plitch, 2003) on July 30, 2003 (event #1), the issue of broker voting has “landed
on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s radar screen.” On November 17, 2004 (event
#2), Dow Jones Newswire (Plitch, 2004) reports that the NYSE is considering a reform of
its proxy voting system. In 2005, the NYSE established the Proxy Working Group with the
mandate to review the exchange’s voting process and especially Rule 452 on broker voting.
The group held its first meeting on April 25, 2005 (event #3) and published a report on June
5, 2006 (event #4), recommending that the NYSE amend Rule 452 to eliminate broker votes
in director elections.6 On October 24, 2006 (event #5), the board of the NYSE adopted the
recommendations of its Working Group and filed a proposed rule change with the SEC.
In the following year, the reform process slowed down. Dow Jones Newswires (White-
house, 2007) reported on September 27, 2007 (event #6) that the NYSE had put on hold
6The report is available at https://www.nyse.com/why-list/partnership/advocacy/ccg.
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any plans to eliminate broker votes. On May 21, 2008 (event #7), a detailed article on Dow
Jones Newswires (Burns, 2008) reported that the elimination of broker voting seems to be
“stuck at the SEC.” The situation changed after Mary Schapiro was appointed by President
Barack Obama as SEC Chairperson in the beginning of 2009, when the SEC published the
proposed rule change for comment on February 26, 2009 (event #8).7 On July 1, 2009 (event
#9), the rule was approved by the SEC and became effective on January 1, 2010.
3 Data and Summary Statistics
Our sample consists of firms in the S&P 500 index at the end of 2009. We require firms to
report their industry classification, firm size and return on assets in Compustat, their stock
returns in CRSP, their institutional holdings in the Thomson Reuters 13F filings database,
their voting standard for director elections and anti-takeover provisions in ISS (formerly
RiskMetrics), and their voting results for director elections in SEC Edgar. This leaves us
with a sample of 457 firms.
Table II reports descriptive statistics of the firms in our sample for the 2009 fiscal year.
The percentage of broker discretionary votes is the number of broker discretionary votes
divided by total votes cast and is 12% on average. The approval rate is the percentage of
votes cast in favor of a particular director. Because the rule change was not in effect in
2009, broker discretionary votes are included in the reported approval rates. We find that
the average approval rate in 2009 is 93%.
7The SEC’s notice of filing of the proposed rule change is available at:
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse/2009/34-59464.pdf.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for our sample of 457 firms. The data are from the 2009 fiscal year.
Votes cast are reported in millions of votes. Percentage of discretionary broker votes is the number of
discretionary broker votes divided by total votes cast. The approval rate is the percentage of votes being in
favor of a director. We calculate the average approval rate per firm. Firm size is total assets and is reported
in millions of dollars. Return on assets is measured by the ratio of operating income before depreciation to
total assets. Institutional ownership is the proportion of outstanding shares held by institutional owners
at the end of 2009. The entrenchment index based on Bebchuk et al. (2009) counts the number of
provisions a firm has out of the following six: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments,
poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments. The
Herfindahl-Hirschman index is the sum of the squared market shares of firms based on three-digit SIC
codes. Majority voting equals one for a majority voting standard, zero for a plurality voting standard, and
0.5 for a plurality-plus-resignation voting standard.
Variable Mean Median Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Total votes cast (in millions) 554 246 1,077 11 12,409
Percentage of 0.121 0.107 0.065 0.001 0.441
discretionary broker votes
Approval rate 0.931 0.960 0.082 0.490 0.997
Firm size (in millions $) 52,559 11,848 194,279 680 2,223,299
Return on assets 0.128 0.118 0.088 -0.242 0.655
Institutional ownership 0.847 0.865 0.132 0.312 1.000
Entrenchment index 3.562 3.000 1.183 0.000 6.000
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 0.187 0.148 0.173 0.019 1.000
Majority voting 0.663
4 Market Response to the Reform of Broker Voting
We study the effect of the elimination of discretionary broker voting in uncontested director
elections on shareholder value. Selecting a control group is challenging because Rule 452
is a member rule, meaning that it applies not only to companies listed on the NYSE, but
also to companies whose stock is held for customers by member firm broker-dealers. Hence,
virtually every listed U.S. firm is affected. Following Zhang (2007) and Akyol et al. (2012),
we therefore use a global market index that excludes U.S. stocks as a control group. As our
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second benchmark, we use firms registered under the Investment Act of 1940 since they were
exempted from the reform: On May 23, 2007, the SEC filed an amendment to the proposed
rule change, requesting that these firms would be exempted if the reform were passed. We
employ this control group only for our last four event dates after May 2007.
Because the events affect all firms simultaneously, we account for cross-sectional correla-
tion of individual stocks by employing a portfolio approach. Specifically, we use the following
model adapted from Schipper and Thompson (1983):
rpt = β0 + β1rm,t +
E∑
e=1
γpeDe + pt. (1)
Here, rpt is the day t return on the equally-weighted portfolio p and rm,t is the contempo-
raneous return of the control group. De is a dummy variable that equals one (minus one)
for any event e that increases (decreases) the probability of the rule change, and equals zero
otherwise.
When using the global index as a control group, we modify the Schipper and Thomp-
son (1983) specification by including lead and lagged market returns, which mitigates the
potential bias from non-synchronous trading due to time differences between countries in
our global market index. We obtain the time series data of the Dow Jones Global ex-U.S.
Composite Index from Reuters. The estimation period is July 30, 2002 until July 31, 2009.
Our main event window is [−1, 1]. Panel A in Table III shows that the overall reaction to
the rule change is not statistically significant when using the global index. The coefficient of
the daily abnormal return is close to zero and the p-value is 0.804. To examine the wealth
effects in more detail, Panel B reports the abnormal returns for each separate event date
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described in Table I (by letting the dummy De equal one for one particular event at a time).
We do not find statistically significant abnormal returns on any of the event days.
Next, we use our second control group, the equally-weighted returns of a sample of
372 listed companies that fall under the Investment Act of 1940. We obtain this sample by
collecting closed-end funds from CRSP and we focus on the last four event dates as explained
above.8 Panel C documents a negative overall wealth effect that is weakly statistically
significant. When we examine the events separately in Panel D, we only find a statistically
significant effect for event 8, relating to the date that the rule was published for comments by
the SEC, after it had appeared to be stuck. The effect of this event on abnormal stock returns
is negative. In unreported tests we redo the entire analysis in Table III using alternative
event windows ([0, 1], [0, 3] and [−15, 1]). Using these windows, we do not find any significant
wealth effects around the events for either of the two control groups. Overall, we conclude
that there is no evidence that the reform increased shareholder value. If anything, weak
evidence suggests that the effect may have been negative.
Although overall wealth effects seem to be insignificant, a subsample of firms may be
affected by the rule change. We examine the effect of the following eight variables on cross-
sectional abnormal returns on the nine event dates. The elimination of broker voting is
likely to be more relevant for firms with a higher percentage of broker votes (1), for firms in
which average director approval rates are low (2) (since the reform makes it easier to vote a
director off the board), and for firms with a majority voting standard (3).9 Firms with weak
8Closed-end funds have a CRSP share code of 14.
9For a given percentage of approval votes, the probability of a director being removed from the board
is highest with a majority voting standard and lowest with a plurality voting standard, with the plurality-
9
Table 3: Wealth Effects of Changes in Rule 452
This table presents daily abnormal returns around events related to changes in the rules for broker
discretionary voting. The event window is [−1, 1]. In Panel A, we report overall daily abnormal returns of
our sample of S&P 500 firms on the nine event dates as reported in Table I, with a global index (the Dow
Jones Global Ex. U.S. index) as benchmark. In Panel B, we report the abnormal returns per event. Panel
C shows the overall wealth effects when we use the returns of companies registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 as a benchmark. In Panel D we report the abnormal returns per event. ***, **, and
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
Panel A. Overall Wealth Effects (Global Index)
Coefficient p-value
Daily abnormal return -0.001 0.804
Market return (t) 0.581*** 0.000
Market return (t-1) -0.157*** 0.000
Market return (t+1) 0.532*** 0.000
Intercept 0.000 0.407
Panel B. Wealth Effects per Event (Global Index)
Coefficient p-value
Event #1 0.003 0.681
Event #2 -0.002 0.752
Event #3 0.000 0.964
Event #4 0.004 0.594
Event #5 0.001 0.931
Event #6 -0.002 0.798
Event #7 -0.002 0.736
Event #8 -0.010 0.133
Event #9 -0.004 0.539
Panel C. Overall Wealth Effects (Investment Company Index)
Coefficient p-value
Daily abnormal return -0.006* 0.096
Market return (t) 1.149*** 0.000
Intercept 0.000 0.668
Panel D. Wealth Effects per Event (Global Index)
Coefficient p-value
Event #6 0.001 0.916
Event #7 -0.005 0.516
Event #8 -0.019** 0.013
Event #9 -0.010 0.168
10
shareholder rights (4), as measured by a high score on the entrenchment index (Bebchuk et
al., 2009), and small firms (5) are also more likely to be affected by the rule change. Regarding
the latter variable, opponents of the reform have argued that the exclusion of broker votes
will make it harder for firms to obtain a necessary quorum, forcing them to devote resources
towards soliciting shareholder votes. This effect would disproportionally hurt small firms.
We also examine the possibility that the reform mattered more for poorly performing firms
(6) or for firms with larger institutional ownership (7). Finally, the relevance of the rule
change might depend on the extent of product market competition (8). Giroud and Mueller
(2010) suggest that corporate governance might not matter for firms in very competitive
industries because market pressure serves as a disciplining device.
For cross-sectional analyses, Sefcik and Thompson (1986) provide a weighting procedure
that controls for cross-correlation and cross-sectional heteroskedasticity in firm residuals. We
follow their procedure and form a matrix F that has a column of ones and P − 1 columns of
characteristics. In our case, P equals nine as we examine eight firm characteristics. We then
form P sets of portfolio weights and compute the portfolio returns for each set of weights as
follows:
W =

W ′1
W ′2
...
W ′P

= (F ′F )−1F ′ (2)
where W is a PxN matrix of portfolio weights, W ′k is the k
th row of portfolio weights, and F
plus-resignation voting standard being in between.
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Table 4: Cross-Sectional Abnormal Returns
This table presents the results from the cross-sectional analysis. Event parameters are based on Sefcik and
Thompson (1986). We regress the abnormal returns on eight firm characteristics. Data are from the 2009
fiscal year. Percentage of discretionary broker votes is the number of discretionary broker votes divided by
total votes cast. The approval rate is the percentage of votes being in favor of a director. We calculate
the average approval rate per firm. Majority voting equals one for a majority voting standard, zero for a
plurality voting standard, and 0.5 for a plurality-plus-resignation voting standard. The entrenchment index
counts the number of provisions a firm has out of the following six: staggered boards, limits to shareholder
bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter
amendments. Institutional ownership is the proportion of outstanding shares held by institutional owners at
the end of 2009. Return on assets is measured by the ratio of operating income before depreciation to total
assets. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is the sum of the
squared market shares of firms based on three-digit SIC codes. Coefficients are multiplied by 100. p-values
are provided in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level,
respectively.
Variable [-1,1] [0,1] [0,3] [-15,1]
Percentage of -0.167 -0.935 -0.893 0.182
discretionary broker votes (0.754) (0.150) (0.053) (0.421)
Approval rate -0.110 -0.117 0.215 -0.020
(0.714) (0.748) (0.407) (0.876)
Majority voting 0.015 -0.029 -0.033 -0.008
(0.808) (0.702) (0.538) (0.772)
Entrenchment index -0.021 -0.049 -0.010 -0.011
(0.401) (0.110) (0.650) (0.303)
Institutional ownership -0.766** -0.833* -0.590* -0.043
(0.026) (0.051) (0.052) (0.774)
Return on assets 0.070 -0.475 0.018 -0.125
(0.907) (0.517) (0.972) (0.624)
Firm size (in millions $) -0.012 -0.026 0.021 -0.006
(0.807) (0.668) (0.627) (0.775)
Herfindahl-Hirschman index -0.356* -0.159 -0.024 -0.041
(0.085) (0.531) (0.894) (0.642)
Intercept 0.960 1.625** 0.253 0.200
(0.133) (0.038) (0.649) (0.463)
is an NxP matrix. We obtain the return on portfolio p on day t by Rpt = W
′
pRit, in which
Rit is an Nx1 vector of individual firms’ stock returns on day t. Finally, we run p portfolio
time-series regressions by using Equation 1. The estimates from the regressions reflect the
effect of each firm characteristic on the overall market reaction to the nine events, while
controlling for the effects of other firm characteristics.
Table IV reports the cross-sectional results for four different event windows. Perhaps
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most surprisingly, we do not find that firms with a relatively high percentage of broker
discretionary votes have different abnormal returns around the event dates than firms with a
relatively low percentage. Almost none of the variables that we examine have a statistically
significant effect on the abnormal returns. Overall, we find little evidence that the change
in Rule 452 affects equity values of any subsets of firms.
5 Conclusion
We study a reform that received widespread attention by academics and practitioners,
namely the elimination of broker voting in director elections. We document that the reform
did not increase equity values. The effect is value-neutral and in some specifications even
negative. These findings are obtained for two different control groups and are corroborated
by various cross-sectional tests.
Many attempts to reform financial markets presume that shareholder empowerment is
beneficial to shareholders. Our findings raise doubts about this premise. They are in line
with recent studies of another reform, shareholder proxy access, which document negative
wealth effects and point to limitations of shareholder empowerment (Akyol et al., 2012;
Larcker et al. 2011). Our study suggests that more research is needed on the potential
costs of stronger shareholder rights. These costs may come in different forms. For example,
shareholders may lack relevant information to take decisions or their intervention might stifle
managerial initiative (Yermack, 2010).
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